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This brief, submitted by the Utah Self-Insurers' 
Association1 in support of Petitioners' request for a Writ of 
Certiorari, hereby incorporates the briefs submitted by Young 
Electric Sign Company (the employer) and The Workers Compensation 
Fund of Utah (an amicus curiae). While the core concern of the 
employer's and amicus' briefs is the same, slightly different 
issues are addressed in the respective briefs so that they can be 
read as a whole without undue repetition. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant 
Petitioners' request for a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Rule 
46(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on the grounds 
that the Utah Court of Appeals' decisions in Crosland v. 
Industrial Commission 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1992) 
("Crosland") and Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330 
(Utah App. 1990) directly conflict. 
2. Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant 
Petitioners' request for a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Rule 
46(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on the grounds 
that (a) Crosland applies a standard of review contrary to and in 
*The Utah Self-Insurers' Association is a non-profit 
organization comprised of Utah's major self-insured employers, 
including (to name a few) AT&T Communications of the Mountain 
States, Inc.; Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints; Chevron, 
U.S.A.; Intermountain Health Care Inc.; Kennecott-Utah Copper 
Division; Morton International; Roadway Services, Inc.; Thiokol 
Corporation; US West Communications; and Utah Transit Authority. 
conflict with the standard of review established by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Morton v. Tax Commission. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1991), and (b) Crosland treats asymptomatic conditions in a way 
that directly conflicts with the Utah Supreme Court's analysis of 
asymptomatic conditions in Holloway v. Industrial Commission, 729 
P.2d 31 (Utah 1986). 
3. Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant 
Petitioners' request for a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Rule 
46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on the grounds 
that Crosland radically departs from long-standing Industrial 
Commission practice by defining the term "permanent impairment" 
in a way that excludes objectively identifiable but asymptomatic 
medical conditions. 
4. Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant 
Petitioners' request for a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Rule 
46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on the grounds 
that Crosland treats an issue of first impression in this 
jurisdiction and profoundly disrupts the deep-seated public 
policy objective (established by the state legislature, the 
Industrial Commission and the Utah Supreme Court) of encouraging 
Utah employers to hire workers with disabilities and impairments 
by establishing a fair basis for apportioning workers 
compensation disability awards. 
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OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In filing their briefs supporting the requested 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, petitioners and amicus curiae 
seek review of the Utah Court of Appeals7 March 20, 1992 decision 
in Crosland v. Industrial Commission, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah 
App. 1992). (See Addendum "A.") 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
Jurisdiction to issue the requested Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court by Article 
VIII, § 3 of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3) 
and 78-2-2(5) (1953 as amended); and, Rule 45, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-66 and § 63-46b-16 (1953 as 
amended) are controlling and are attached as Addendum "B" 
The controlling rule is Rule 46, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
The controlling medical definition of "permanent 
impairment" from the American Medical Association Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (1988) is attached as Addendum 
"C." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This brief incorporates by reference the Case and Fact 
Statements contained in Young Electric Sign Company's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED 
PURSUANT TO RULE 46(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
BECAUSE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' DECISIONS IN CROSLAND AND 
NYREHN DIRECTLY CONFLICT. 
Rule 46(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that the Utah Supreme Court will grant a petitioning 
party's request for a Writ of Certiorari when opinions rendered 
by different panels of the Utah Court of Appeals are in conflict. 
A Writ of Certiorari should be granted in the present case, 
pursuant to Rule 46(a), because the Utah Court of Appeals' 
decisions in Crosland v. Industrial Commission, 183 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1992) and Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 
P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990) (attached as Addendum f,,D") directly 
conflict. 
In Crosland, the Utah Court of Appeals held that a 
worker's asymptomatic preexisting condition cannot be used by the 
Utah Industrial Commission to apportion a permanent partial 
disability award between the worker's industrially-caused 
impairment and any impairment arising from the worker's 
4 
asymptomatic preexisting condition. Under Crosland, the worker's 
employer must compensate the worker for his industrially-caused 
impairment and for any impairment assignable to the worker's 
asymptomatic (but objectively identifiable) preexisting 
condition. 
Conversely, in Nyrehn, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded an 
applicant's claim and expressly directed the Industrial 
Commission to apportion its disability award between the 
applicant's industrially caused injury and asymptomatic 
preexisting condition.2 Clearly, the remand order in Nyrehn and 
the holding in Crosland are at odds.3 The Utah Supreme Court 
should grant the petitioners' request for a Writ of Certiorari in 
order to resolve the conflict between the Utah Court of Appeals' 
apportionment rulings. 
2Significantly, the asymptomatic preexisting spondylolysis 
condition in Nyrehn is exactly the same asymptomatic preexisting 
condition involved in this case. 
3Even though Nyrehn dealt with a permanent total disability 
claim, whereas Crosland involves a permanent partial disability 
claim, the two decisions nevertheless fundamentally conflict 
because they treat the same asymptomatic preexisting condition in 
diametrically opposite ways. 
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POINT II 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 8HOULD BE GRANTED 
PURSUANT TO RULE 46(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
BECAUSE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN CROSLAND 
DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S RULINGS 
IN MORTON AND HOLLOWAY. 
Rule 46(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that the Utah Supreme Court will grant a petitioner's 
request for a Writ of Certiorari when "a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of state or federal law in a way 
that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court." In 
the present case, a Writ of Certiorari should be granted pursuant 
to Rule 46(b) for two reasons. First, the Writ should be granted 
because the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Crosland both 
misconstrues and misapplies the standard of review criteria set 
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Morton v. Tax Commission. 814 
P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). Second, the Writ should be granted because 
the Crosland decision treats asymptomatic conditions in a way 
that directly conflicts with the Utah Supreme Court's analysis of 
asymptomatic conditions in Holloway v. Industrial Commission, 729 
P.2d 31 (Utah 1986). 
A. Conflict with Morton. 
In Morton v. Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991)f 
this Court held that administrative cases initiated after January 
1, 1988 would be subject to review by Utah's appellate courts 
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under the standards articulated in the Utah Administrative 
Procedure Act (UAPA) , Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1988). Id. at 
583. Under UAPA, this Court stated that an administrative 
agency's interpretation of a statutory term—like the term 
"permanent impairment" contained in Utah's Workers Compensation 
Act—will be given deference if there exists "an explicit or 
implicit grant of discretion . . . in the governing statute." 
Id. at 588. This Court then observed that in determining whether 
to apply a deferential standard of review: 
. . .what has developed as the dispositive 
factor is whether the agency, by virtue of 
its experience or expertise, is in a better 
position than the courts to give effect to 
the regulatory objective to be achieved. 
[Accordingly]. . .in the absence of a 
discernable legislative intent concerning the 
specific question in issue, a choice among 
permissible interpretations of a statute is 
largely a policy determination. The agency 
that has been granted authority to administer 
the statute is the body to make such a 
determination. . . .[A]n appellate court 
should not substitute its judgment for the 
agency's judgment concerning the wisdom of 
the agency's policy. In such a case, it is 
appropriate to conclude that the legislature 
has delegated authority to the agency to 
decide the issue. [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 586, 589. 
The Crosland decision wholly fails to apply the 
foregoing standard of review to the facts of this case. Crosland 
does properly acknowledge that Morton is the law governing the 
7 
standard of review. Crosland even acknowledges, in footnote two 
of the decision, the implied grant of discretion inquiry (quoted 
above) pertinent to this case. However, these acknowledgements 
are mere lipservice. Having made the cursory acknowledgments, 
Crosland tautologically declares that "[t]his case requires an 
interpretation of the 1988 amendment to the Workers Compensation 
Act and thus presents a question of statutory construction and 
legislative intent which we may review for correctness." 183 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. The Crosland panel is clearly mistaken. 
Crosland should be reviewed and reversed on the grounds that (1) 
the decision ignores the language from Morton quoted above, and 
(2) the decision makes no attempt to discern any express or 
implied legislative grant of authority. 
1. Crosland Ignores Morton's Implied Intent Mandate. 
In analyzing Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-66 (1988), the 
Crosland court was apparently unable to discern any express or 
implied grant of legislative discretion to the Industrial 
Commission. Given this inability, the Crosland court was obliged 
to defer to the Industrial Commission's interpretation of 
"permanent impairment," because, as this Court observed in 
Morton, "in the absence of a discernable legislative intent 
concerning the specific question in issue. . . rt"|he agency that 
has been granted authority to administer the statute is the body 
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to make such a determination, . . . fand] filn such a case, it is 
appropriate to conclude that the legislature has delegated 
authority to the agency to decide the issue." [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 589. The Utah Court of Appeals completely side-stepped 
this Supreme Court directive in conducting its standard of review 
analysis. On this basis, Crosland directly conflicts with Morton 
and should be reversed. 
2. Crosland Fails to Discern the Legislative Grant of 
Discretion to the Industrial Commission. 
Crosland should also be reviewed and reversed on the 
basis that the Utah Workers Compensation statute affords both an 
express and an implied grant of discretion to the Utah Industrial 
Commission to arrive at definitions for medical terms of art like 
"permanent impairment."4 When the Utah Workers Compensation Act 
is read as a whole, the legislature has, at a minimum, granted 
the Industrial Commission discretion to apply its expertise in: 
a. Determining the amount of permanent 
partial disability compensation to be 
4This Court has routinely held that the Utah Industrial 
Commission and other administrative agencies are afforded 
deference as they exercise their unique expertise in fairly 
evaluating the factors that comprise compensable claims. See, 
e.g., Savage Brothers, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 723 P.2d 
1085 (Utah 1986) (discretion given agency's interpretation of 
ambiguous or technical terms); Hurlev v. Board of Review. 767 P.2d 
524 (Utah 1988); Bennett v. Industrial Commission. 726 P.2d 427 
(Utah 1986) (Commission given discretion to interpret a statute when 
its expertise gives it the best position from which to view the 
statute). 
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"awarded by the commission based on the 
medical evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-
66. 
b. Establishing disability compensation 
using an average weekly wage method or 
"such other method" to be determined by the 
Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-75(1) 
(g)(iii); 
c. Determining compensability issues 
utilizing "a medical panel appointed by the 
Commission." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77(1)(a); 
d. Adjudicating the medical aspects of a 
controverted case utilizing a medical 
director or medical consultants which "the 
Commission in its sole discretion may 
employ." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77(1)(d); 
e. Directing the medical panel appointed by 
an administrative law judge to render its 
medical report "in writing to the Commission 
in a form prescribed by the Commission." 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77(2)(b); and 
f. Rendering its decision on the medical 
aspects of a controverted case based upon 
either the findings of the medical pan€*l or 
other substantial conflicting evidence in the 
case. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77(2)(d).5 
Based on the overall legislative framework of the Utah 
Workers Compensation statute and this Court's past recognition of 
discretion granted to the Commission, the Crosland court erred in 
5Under Morton, a phrase like "as determined by the Commission" 
is an indication of an express grant of discretion by the 
legislature. 814 P.2d at 588 f.n. 40. Crosland fails to even 
consider the existence of such statutory language contained in 
Utah's Workers Compensation Act. 
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failing to defer to the Industrial Commission's interpretation of 
the medical term "permanent impairment." The court should have 
applied an abuse of discretion standard of review when assessing 
how the Industrial Commission should define a medical term of art 
like "permanent impairment." If the Court of Appeals had 
properly deferred to the Industrial Commission's expertise, the 
Court would have affirmed the Commission's disability award 
without hesitation. This is precisely the result that should now 
be achieved as the Utah Supreme Court reviews and reverses 
Crosland. 
B. Conflict with Holloway. 
The Utah Supreme Court, by virtue of the concurring 
opinions of Justices Zimmerman and Howe in Holloway v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 31 (Utah 1986), has specifically indicated 
that entirely latent, undetectable, asymptomatic preexisting 
conditions, when aggravated by an industrial injury, clearly 
trigger the higher legal causation analysis under Allen v. 
Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). The existence of 
a latent preexisting condition (which can be discovered by means 
of objective medical tests) is critical in a legal causation 
analysis, because, in Justice Zimmerman's words: 
. . .the [important] question is whether the 
worker came to the workplace with a condition 
that increased his risk of injury. If he did 
and that condition contributed to the injury, 
11 
then Allen's higher standard of legal 
causation comes into play so as to place that 
worker on the same footing as one who did not 
come to work with a preexisting condition. 
• • • 
To rule otherwise would create the strong 
likelihood that a worker who has a 
preexisting condition and whose virtually 
inevitable injury simply happens to occur at 
work will be able to foist the cost of that 
injury on his employer when the workplace had 
little to do with causing the injury. 
729 P.2d at 32. The public policy concern underpinning Justice 
Zimmerman's pronouncement is that Utah employers should be 
encouraged to hire individuals with preexisting disabilities and 
impairments. See, Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 
P.2d 334 (Utah 1980). 
Ignoring Justice Zimmerman's (and the Utah Supreme 
Court's) public policy concerns, the Utah Court of Appeals' 
analysis in Crosland proclaims that asymptomatic preexisting 
conditions are of no relevance in apportioning a permanent 
partial disability award. According to Crosland, Utah employers 
are to be held liable for their employees' medically identifiable 
asymptomatic preexisting conditions when those conditions 
directly contribute to the employees' industrial injuries. This 
holding completely undermines Justice Zimmerman's directive as to 
how asymptomatic preexisting conditions are to be handled. 
Crosland should be reviewed by this Court and reversed because it 
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runs counter to both the legal analysis and the public policy 
advanced in Holloway. 
POINT III 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED 
PURSUANT TO RULE 46(c) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE BECAUSE CROSLAND RADICALLY ALTERS 
LONG-STANDING INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PRACTICE. 
Rule 46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that the Utah Supreme Court will grant a petitioner's 
request for Writ of Certiorari when "a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an 
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision." A Writ of 
Certiorari should be granted in the present case pursuant to Rule 
46(c) because the Crosland opinion has completely departed from 
the long-standing and well-accepted practice at the Industrial 
Commission of apportioning permanent partial disability awards 
between asymptomatic preexisting conditions and industrially-
caused impairments.6 
^he Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, as an amicus curiae, 
has set forth the historical practice before the Industrial 
Commission in its Certiorari brief. The Utah Self-Insurers' 
Association incorporates that section of the Workers Compensation 
Fund's brief by reference. 
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As this Court reviews the Workers Compensation Fund's 
explanation of the historical practice before the Industrial 
Commission, and the legislative intent underlying the 1988 
amendment to § 35-1-66, it is vital for the Court to recognize 
how far the Crosland opinion has departed from the Industrial 
Commission's attempt to achieve consistency in analyzing 
permanent impairment issues in a variety of contexts. To fully 
understand the Industrial Commission's concern in this regard, 
the Supreme Court needs to recognize (1) what the term "permanent 
impairment" has meant to the Industrial Commission, and to all 
practitioners before the Industrial Commission, prior to 
Crosland, (b) the three major contexts in which the term 
"permanent impairment" has been consistently applied by the 
Industrial Commission, and (c) the explosion of litigation that 
will result because Crosland's definition of "permanent 
impairment" completely undermines the Industrial Commission's 
heretofore consistent and fair application of Utah's Workers 
Compensation law. 
A. Definition of Permanent Impairment. 
As discussed in the Certiorari Brief submitted by 
petitioner Young Electric Sign Company, the term "permanent 
impairment" is a medical term of art, defined only by qualified 
medical practitioners. For decades, those practitioners have 
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concluded that a permanent impairment can be assessed and rated 
on the basis of either a medical condition which results in 
impaired functioning or a completely asymptomatic physiological 
abnormality.7 (See the AMA Guides definition attached as 
Addendum "C") Clearly, the Crosland panel overstepped the 
bounds of judicial restraint in attempting to redefine a medical 
term of art which (1) they are not qualified to define, and 
(2) which has already been defined by the American Medical 
Association, and followed by the Utah Industrial Commission for 
many years. On this basis alone the Crosland decision can and 
should be reversed. 
B. Consistent Application of the Term "Permanent 
Impairment." 
Using the medically established definition for 
"permanent impairment" (outlined above), the Utah Industrial 
Commission is daily faced with the task of consistently applying 
the term in three primary arenas — (1) the assessment of whether 
an applicant's claim meets the higher standard of legal causation 
7The Crosland court fails to distinguish the term "impairment" 
from the term "disability" when the court equates "permanent 
impairment" with "some deterioration or diminishment in function." 
183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. As the AMA Guides (Addendum "C") 
explain, "'impairment' means an alteration of an individual's 
health status that is assessed by medical means. . . .Impairment 
gives rise to [functional] disability only when the medical 
condition limits the individual's capacity to meet demands that 
pertain to non-medical fields and activities." Guides, p. 2. 
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under Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), 
(2) permanent partial disability claims under Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-66, and (3) permanent total disability claims under Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-69. In all three areas, the Industrial 
Commission has, for years, consistently applied the term 
"permanent impairment" to include both functional preexisting 
impairments, and latent asymptomatic preexisting conditions. 
(See footnote 6, supra.) The Crosland opinion completely 
disrupts the Industrial Commission's heretofore consistent 
application of the term. 
After Crosland, the Industrial Commission is left with 
the prospect of applying one meaning of "permanent impairment" 
(and "asymptomatic condition") to the higher legal causation 
analysis (pursuant to Holloway, supra), while applying a 
completely different definition of "permanent impairment" in its 
analysis of a permanent partial disability claim. An application 
of different definitions for the same medical term of art makes 
absolutely no sense and will lead to burgeoning confusion and 
inconsistency in Industrial Commission adjudication of workers 
compensation claims. 
The inconsistency and confusion in Industrial 
Commission practice spawned by Crosland will be increased when 
the Commission is faced with the question of whether the 
16 
Ho1Iowav analysis of asymptomatic conditions or the Crosland 
asymptomatic condition analysis applies in the context of 
permanent total disability claims.8 Again, the same treatment of 
asymptomatic conditions (and the same definition of "permanent 
impairment") should apply across the board, whether a claim 
qualifies as a permanent partial disability claim or permanent 
total disability claim. The confusion arising from inconsistent 
definitions applicable to the same medical term of art cannot be 
allowed to stand. Crosland should be taken up on certiorari and 
reversed. 
C The Explosion of Litigation. 
As noted above, the Crosland decision has now opened 
the floodgates for an invidious form of Industrial Commission 
litigation which has previously been prevented by a unified 
definition of "permanent impairment." Following Crosland. 
counsel for injured employees will argue that the higher legal 
causation standard under Allen cannot be triggered by the 
existence of an asymptomatic preexisting condition because our 
very own Utah Court of Appeals has held that such a condition 
8Under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69, the Employers Reinsurance Fund 
shares liability with the employer in permanent total disability 
cases provided the claimant has "at least a 10% whole person 
permanent impairment from any cause or origin . . . ." The 
Industrial Commission must now puzzle over whether a Holloway or 
Crosland analysis of asymptomatic preexisting conditions should 
apply to § 35-1-69. 
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cannot be the basis for apportionment of a permanent partial 
disability claim. 
The explosion in Industrial Commission litigation will 
also be fueled by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's assertion 
that the Crosland definition of "permanent impairment" must apply 
in permanent total disability cases as well as in permanent 
partial disability cases. Prior to Crosland. the administrator 
of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund routinely accepted 
apportionment on the basis of an injured employee's asymptomatic 
preexisting condition. Crosland has changed this practice. 
Employers will be now responsible for the payment of all of an 
employee's permanent total disability claim despite the existence 
of a profound (and often "eggshell") asymptomatic preexisting 
condition. Crosland's likely effect on the volume and intensity 
of Industrial Commission litigation, not to mention its impact on 
the appeals from that litigation to Utah's higher courts, is a 
frightful prospect. The Utah Supreme Court should take immediate 
action to shut the floodgates. 
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POINT IV 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED PURSUANT TO RULE 46(d) 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE BECAUSE CASE 
DEFINITION OF "PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT11 IS AN ISSUE OF FIRST 
IMPRESSION FRAUGHT WITH PROFOUND PUBLIC POLICY RAMIFICATIONS. 
Rule 46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that the Utah Supreme Court will grant a petitioner's 
request for a Writ of Certiorari when "the Court of Appeals has 
decided an important question of municipal, state, or federal law 
which has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court." 
Pursuant to Rule 46(d), the Utah Supreme Court should grant the 
requested Writ of Certiorari and should review the Crosland 
panel's attempt to redefine "permanent impairment," an issue of 
first impression for Utah's appellate courts. This redefinition 
has extremely profound and wide-sweeping public policy 
implications. 
As discussed in Point III above, the Utah Court of 
Appeals redefinition of "permanent impairment" will not only 
spawn needless litigation, but it will likely have an extremely 
adverse impact on Utah employers. If the Crosland definition of 
"permanent impairment" is used within the context of the higher 
legal causation analysis under Allen, or for the purpose of 
apportioning liability to the Employers' Reinsurance Fund in the 
context of permanent total disability claims, employers will be 
forced to shoulder the burden of potentially exorbitant 
19 
disability awards based on medical conditions not caused by their 
employees' industrial injuries. The whole nature of how 
employers do business in Utah will be fundamentally changed by 
Crosland. Utah employers may attempt to screen out employees who 
have objectively definable (but nevertheless asymptomatic) 
preexisting conditions. This effort on the part of Utah 
employers flies directly in the face of the public policy 
traditionally advanced by Utah's Workers Compensation statutes 
and Utah Supreme Court decisions like Capitano, supra, and 
Holloway, supra. Prior to Crosland. the express public policy 
has been to encourage employers to hire workers who have 
preexisting conditions—asymptomatic or otherwise—by ensuring 
those employers that they will not be left economically 
responsible for astronomical workers compensation disability 
awards which relate entirely to preexisting conditions. See, 
Intermountain Health Care v. Ortega. 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977) 
(Utah employers are not responsible for the payment of permanent 
partial disability compensation either for manifested or 
quiescent preexisting conditions). In a nutshell, Crosland 
completely undermines the well-established public policy of 
Utah's workers compensation scheme. 
For this reason, and the reasons set forth above, Crosland 
should be reviewed on Certiorari and reversed. 
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proficient in his work. General 
knowledge or expertise acquired 
through employment in a common 
calling cannot be appropriated as a 
trade secret. "The efficiency and 
skills which an employee develops 
through his work belong to him and 
not to his former employer." Hall-
mark Personnel of Texas, Inc. v. 
Franks, Tex. Cr. App. 562 S.W.2d 
933, 936 (1978). The same principles 
apply to the covenant here. We 
hold that the covenant not to 
compete had the effect of preven-
ting the defendant from exploiting 
skills and experience which he had a 
right to exploit. 
Finlay, 645 P.2d at 628 (footnote omitted). 
The trial court and the majority ignore the 
fundamental policy on which Finlay rested. If 
the trial court had correctly applied Finlay to 
the facts of this case, Kasco could not have 
made the requisite showing under Rule 
65A(e)(l) that it was entitled to the relief 
demanded. Finlay requires that before a trial 
court can conclude that a covenant not to 
compete is enforceable, it must first determine 
that the employee was not engaged in a 
common calling and that the employer has a 
legally protectible interest. Finlay, 645 P.2d at 
627. A generalized assertion that preventing 
the completion of a former employee will 
protect the employer's goodwill is not enough. 
Id. at 627-28; System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 
426. 
In this case, defendant Larry Benson was a 
salesman of butcher supplies. He was a route 
salesman, pure and simple. He covered a rural 
territory in Utah and Idaho. He had no trade 
secrets. He was not involved in management. 
As a result of his common calling, he necess-
arily knew both the actual and potential cus-
tomers for the goods he sold in the commun-
ities of his territory. Customers of butcher 
supplies in such areas are not hard to find; a 
scan of local telephone books would quickly 
identify them. Finally, Kasco's customers are 
not found on a secret customer list. 
The majority does not even address the issue 
of whether Benson was engaged in a common 
calling. It rests solely on the specious rationale 
that in his territory, Benson was Kasco. Route 
salespersons are commonly viewed in their 
territories as representatives of their emplo-
yers. But that is no reason to hold them in 
semi-bondage to their former employers 
when they change jobs. The majority notes 
that Benson was one of Kasco's top five sal-
espersons. The law, however, does not protect 
only less able individuals. 
The consequence of the majority's ruling is 
that a noncompetition covenant may be enf-
orced against any route salesperson whenever 
it could be said that the employer may lose 
some sales, i.e., "goodwill," if the former 
employee is not restrained from competing. 
That, of course, can be said with respect to all 
route salespersons, no matter how common 
their callings. 
Durham, Justice, concurs in the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart. 
1. Clearly, the terms of an injunction may be mod-
ified after it goes into effect. However, the law is 
that a movant must first show some change in circ-
umstances. Kasco has not alleged any changed cir-
cumstances that bear upon the issue of when the 
injunction should have commenced. 
2. In Rose Park, the employee enjoined was a pro-
fessional person solely responsible for building the 
business of a small neighborhood pharmacy. 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Petitioner, Gary Crosland (Crosland), seeks 
review of an Industrial Commission order 
awarding him compensation for one-half of 
his industrial accident injury and denying 
compensation for the remainder. Crosland was 
denied compensation for the half of the injury 
that ensued from the accident's aggravation of 
a preexisting asymptomatic condition. We 
reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
On February 9, 1989, Crosland injured his 
lower back as he attempted to help another 
employee move a 200-pound sign while 
working for Respondent, Young Electric Sign 
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Company. Crosland felt immediate pain when, 
moving the sign around the corner, he twisted 
his upper torso. When he could barely walk 
the next day at work, his employer sent him 
for medical treatment. Crosland's treating 
physician concluded that Crosland had a pre-
existing asymptomatic defect and that the 
industrial accident caused the defect to become 
acute and symptomatic. The insurance adju-
ster's examining physician determined that 
Crosland had preexisting, asymptomatic spo-
ndylolysis (breaking down or dissolution of 
the body of the vertebra) and spondylolisthesis 
(forward movement of the body of one of the 
lower lumbar vertebrae on the vertebra below 
it), adding that all the present symptoms 
Crosland suffered were related to the indust-
rial injury. Crosland had never had any back 
problems or required medical treatment for his 
back prior to this accident. 
The medical panel appointed by the Admi-
nistrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that follo-
wing the accident, Crosland had a twenty 
percent permanent partial impairment of the 
whole body. The panel attributed half, or ten 
percent, permanent partial impairment, to the 
industrial accident and half to the asympto-
matic preexisting condition medically aggrav-
ated by the accident. The panel commented 
that "[i]t is entirely possible he could have 
gone on for an indefinite period had it not 
been for the event described, but it is unlikely 
he would have had the degree of difficulty had 
he not had the developmental abnormality." 
Based on this evaluation, the ALJ denied 
Crosland compensation for the ten percent 
permanent partial impairment attributable to 
the preexisting asymptomatic condition aggr-
avated by the industrial accident, thus allo-
wing compensation only for the ten percent 
whole body permanent partial impairment 
attributable to the industrial accident itself. 
The Industrial Commission affirmed. 
Crosland appeals, arguing that he should 
receive compensation for the entire twenty 
percent whole person permanent partial imp-
airment caused by the industrial accident's 
aggravation of the preexisting asymptomatic 
condition. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This proceeding is governed by the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah 
Code Ann. §§63-46b-l to-22 (1989 & 
Supp. 1991).! Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
governs the scope of our review of the Indu-
strial Commission's order, allowing relief if 
Crosland has been "substantially prejudiced" 
because "the agency has erroneously interpr-
eted or applied the law." In Morton Int'l, Inc. 
v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587-89 (Utah 1991), 
the supreme court held that under this section 
we may review for correctness and need not 
defer to the agency's interpretation unless 
there is "a grant of discretion to the agency 
concerning the language in question, either 
expressly made in the statute or implied from 
the statutory language."2 Id. at 589. When 
legislative intent can be discerned, however, 
we give the agency's interpretation no defer-
ence. Id.; accord Mor-Flo Indus, v. Board of 
Review, 166 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah App. 
1991). This case requires an interpretation of 
the 1988 amendment to the Workers' Comp-
ensation Act and thus presents a question of 
statutory construction and legislative intent 
which we may review for correctness. Under 
this higher standard, to afford relief we must 
find that the Commission erroneously interp-
reted the law to Crosland's substantial prej-
udice. 
ANALYSIS 
The parties agree that Crosland suffered an 
industrial injury and that he has satisfied both 
the medical and legal cause requirements of 
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986).3 The sole issue on appeal is 
whether Crosland should receive compensation 
for the ten percent asymptomatic preexisting 
condition which was aggravated by his indus-
trial accident and contributed to the injury. 
Utah courts have followed the well-
established common law rule that when an 
industrial accident lights up or aggravates a 
preexisting deficiency or disease, the resulting 
disability is compensable as long as the indu-
strial accident was the medical and legal cause 
of the injury. Nuzum v. Roosendahl Const, 
and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 
1977); Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (modifying Nuzum 
to add the higher standard for legal 
cause when preexisting conditions are invo-
lved); Virgin v. Board of Review of the Indus. 
Comm% 803 P.2d 1284, 1288 (Utah App. 
1990); see also Giles v. Industrial Comm'n, 
692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984) (employee received 
compensation for detached retina resulting 
from work-related accident, even though 
employee's prior cataract surgery rendered 
him somewhat predisposed to retinal detach-
ment). This rule is consistent with the stated 
policy of liberally construing and applying the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act to provide 
coverage, accomplishing the Act's purpose of 
affording financial security to injured emplo-
yees. State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial 
Comm% 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984) 
(citation omitted). In addition, the rule com-
ports with Professor Larson's comments: 
Nothing is better established in 
compensation law than the rule 
that, when industrial injury preci-
pitates disability from a latent prior 
condition, such as heart disease, 
cancer, back weakness and the like, 
the entire disability is compensable, 
and except in states having special 
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statutes on aggravation of disease, 
no attempt is made to weigh the 
relative contribution of the accident 
and the preexisting condition to the 
final disability or death. Apportio-
nment does not apply in such cases, 
nor in any case in which the prior 
condition was not a disability in the 
compensation sense. 
2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 
§59.22(a) (1989) (footnotes omitted). 
Juxtaposed against this strong common law 
background allowing an employee compensa-
tion for aggravation of a preexisting latent 
condition is the policy of freeing an employer 
from liability for an employee disability exis-
ting prior to the work-related accident. For 
permanent partial impairments, this policy is 
effectuated by the medical and legal causation | 
requirements of Allen.4 In addition, by ame- ! 
ndment effective July 1, 1988, the legislature 
added the following language to the Workers' 
Compensation Act: "Permanent partial disa-
bility compensation may not be paid for any* 
permanent impairment that existed prior to an 
industrial accident." Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
66 (1988) (emphasis added). We are now called 
upon to decide whether the asymptomatic 
weakness in Crosland's back was a 
"permanent impairment" within the meaning 
of the statute at the time of the injury.5 The 
stated purpose of this amendment to section 
35-1-66 is to clarify "that permanent partial 
disability compensation entitlements are based 
on physical impairment caused by an indust-
rial accident." Laws of Utah ch. 116 H.B. no. 
218 preamble. Crosland urges us to interpret 
the term "permanent impairment" to exclude 
asymptomatic conditions such as his and to 
include only conditions "[connoting] some 
deterioration or diminishment in function." 
This definition comports with the use of the 
word "permanent impairment" at the begin-
ning of amended section 35-1-66, stating, 
with our emphasis, that an employee who 
receives a "permanent impairment as a result 
of an industrial accident ... may receive a 
permanent partial disability award." This 
wording implies functional "permanent imp-
airment" and does not include asymptomatic 
nonratable conditions. 
This interpretation is also in line with deci-
sions in other states, which have allowed for 
compensation under similar statutes. Alabama 
courts, for example, have refused to require 
employees to accept reduced compensation for 
injuries resulting from aggravation of preexi-
sting conditions. See, e.g., International Paper 
Co, v. Rogers, 500 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1986) (construing term "infirmity" 
in statute similar to Utah's to allow unreduced 
compensation for employee with preexisting 
asymptomatic spondylolisthesis: "[i]t is a 
fundamental principle that an employer takefs] 
ird of Review - -
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the employee subject to his physical condition 
when he starts his employment"); see also Ter-
williger v. Green Fuel Economizer, Inc., 
468 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (App. Div. 1983) (no 
apportionment when preexisting condition was 
dormant and not disabling); Daniels v. State 
Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 294 
S.E.2d 184, 188 (W. Va. 1982) (under state 
apportionment statute, preexisting impairment 
must be definitely ascertained and rated; 
general rule is that apportionment statutes do 
not apply when "the prior condition was not 
physically disabling"). 
Like other states, Utah has not apportioned 
between the employer and the employee liab-
ility for symptoms resulting from one indust-
rial accident.6 We find no reason to conclude 
that section 35-1-66 as amended requires 
apportionment of liability for aggravation of 
an asymptomatic condition. Nor do we find 
that the amendment does more than to clarify 
that an employer is free from liability for an 
employee's preexisting ratable functional 
impairment not caused by the industrial acci-
dent. Based on the usage of the term 
"permanent impairment" in the statute, and 
on Utah case law at the time of the injury, 
which allowed full compensation for aggrav-
ation of a preexisting asymptomatic condition, 
we believe the term "permanent impairment" 
should be interpreted to refer to a ratable 
physical condition exhibiting some diminished 
function. Because Crosland's back was com-
pletely functional prior to the industrial acci-
dent and could have continued to be functi-
onal absent the accident, we conclude that 
apportionment was inappropriate in this case 
and that the Commission erroneously failed to 
award full compensation for Crosland's 
twenty percent whole person permanent partial 
impairment caused by the industrial accident. 
We reverse the order of the Industrial Com-
mission. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. The UAPA governs all administrative proceedings 
commenced after January 1, 1988. 
2. A legislative grant of discretion might be implied 
when the terms of the statute leave the specific 
question at issue unresolved, allowing for more than 
one permissible reading of the statute. The choice 
among permissible interpretations might then be 
deemed a policy choice for the agency, and we 
would not substitute our judgment absent an abuse 
of the delegated discretion. Morton Int'l, 814 P.2d 
at 587-89. 
3. To prove legal cause under the higher standard of 
Allen, a claimant with a preexisting condition which 
contributes to the injury must show that his work-
related exertion was unusual or extraordinary, in 
excess of the normally expected level of nonemplo-
yment activity for men and women in the latter half 
of the twentieth century. Allen, 729 P.2d at 25-26. 
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If the claimant has no contributory preexisting 
condition, a usual or ordinary exertion suffices to 
prove legal cause. Id. (citing IB Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law §38.83(a) & (b) (1991)). That 
Crosland's exertion in lifting the sign was greater 
than normal is undisputed in this case. Conseque-
ntly, we need not evaluate the application of the Allen 
rule under the amended statute. 
4. For permanent total disabilities, the policy is 
accomplished by providing the employer contribu-
tion from the Employers' Compensation Fund. See 
note 6. 
5. A 1991 amendment to the Utah Workers' Com-
pensation Act defines the terms "impairment" and 
"disability." "'Disability' means becoming medic-
ally impaired as to function." Utah Code Ann. §35-
1-44(4) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). 
"'Impairment' is a purely medical condition refle-
cting any anatomical or functional abnormality or 
loss." Utah Code Ann. §35-1-44(6) (Supp. 1991) 
(emphasis added). Because these statutory definit-
ions were not in effect at the time of Crosland's 
injury, we need not decide their applicability to the 
wording of the 1988 amendment. Instead we rely on 
the law as it existed at the time of the injury. 
6. Apportionment has only occurred between the 
employer and the Employers' Compensation Fund 
under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69 (1988), which, 
with our emphasis, states in pertinent part, 
If an employee, who has at least a WVo 
whole person permanent impairment 
from any cause or origin, subsequently 
incurs an additional impairment by an 
accident arising out of and in the course 
of the employee's employment, and if 
the additional impairment results in 
permanent total disability, the employer 
or its insurance carrier and the Emplo-
yers' Reinsurance Fund are liable for 
the payment of benefits as follows:... 
This provision thus fully compensates an employee 
when an industrial accident and a preexisting imp-
airment result in permanent total disability, without 
imposing the complete burden of compensation for 
the total disability on the employer. The purpose of 
this statutory scheme appears to be to resolve the 
problems arising when the sum of two injuries is 
greater than the parts (e.g., an industrial accident 
resulting in blindness in one eye of a worker already 
blind in the other eye, thus creating permanent total 
disability), without discouraging employers from 
hiring handicapped persons. The employee is com-
pensated for the permanent total disability, but the 
employer is partially compensated from the fund so 
that the cost to the employer is not as severe. E.g., 
Hall v. Industrial Comm'n, 710 P.2d 175, 178 
(Utah 1985) (under this section, a showing of causal 
connection between the preexisting impairment and 
the industrial injury is not required; only that they 
cumulatively result in substantially greater disabi-
lity); see 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 
§59.31(a) (1989). In making its apportioned award, 
the Commission relied upon Nyrchn v. Industrial 
Comm% 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990), cert, 
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). This reliance is 
misplaced because the Nyrehn case merely apport-
ions between the employer and the fund under this 
section and does not address the issue of apportio-
nment between the employer and the employee. 
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publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's denial of a 
protective order under the Cohabitant Abuse 
Act, claiming the trial court erred in requiring 
her to demonstrate immediate peril. We 
reverse. 
On February 21, 1991, plaintiff filed a 
complaint pursuant to the Cohabitant Abuse 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§30-6-1 to-11 
(1989 & Supp. 1991), and requested an ex 
pane protective order. Plaintiff's pro se 
complaint stated defendant threatened to kill 
her if she served him with divorce papers. 
On February 28, 1991, both parties appe-
ared in court without counsel. The judge 
stated that he had reviewed the complaint 
seeking a protective order. Before hearing any 
testimony, the judge stated he was going to 
dismiss the complaint. Explaining his decision, 
the judge continued: 
I understand that you may be in 
fear, but this is an improper use of 
the protective order. The protective 
order is intended to cover those 
circumstances where one is in, what 
we call imminent fear. An imminent 
fear doesn't mean that you may 
anticipate some future problem. It 
means that you are in fear of some 
present problem. That is if there is 
an immediate threat. This threat is 
based upon your fear that if you 
file divorce papers that you may be 
in jeopardy. You have every right 
to file divorce papers. You have 
every right in that proceeding to 
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porary disability lasts more than fourteen days, com-
pensation shall also be payable for the first three 
days after the injury is received. 1973 
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of 
payments — State average weekly 
wage defined. 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee 
shall receive 66 2 ' }% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such 
disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 
100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of 
$45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four such dependent children, not to 
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at 
the time of the injury, but not to exceed 100% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits 
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a 
period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
In the event a light duty medical release is ob-
tained prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of 
recovery, and when no such light duty employment is 
available to the employee from the employer, tempo-
rary disability benefits shall continue to be paid. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to 
in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be determined 
by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of 
each year, the total wages reported on contribution 
reports to the department of employment security un-
der the commission for the preceding calendar year 
shall be divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total in-
sured workers reported for the preceding year by 
twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall 
be divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus 
determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state 
average weekly wage as so determined shall be used 
as the basis for computing the maximum compensa-
tion rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occu-
pational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 
1 determination, and any death resulting therefrom. 
1981 
35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — 
Amount of payments. 
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability 
for work, the employee shall receive weekly compen-
sation equal to: 
(a) 66^/3% of the difference between the em-
ployee's average weekly wages before the acci-
dent and the weekly wages the employee is able 
to earn after the accident, but not more than 
100% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of injury; plus 
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each 
dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent children, but 
only up to a total weekly compensation that does 
not exceed 100% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of injury. 
(2) The commission may make an award for tempo-
rary partial disability for work at any time prior to 
eight years after the date of the injury to an em-
ployee: 
*a) whose physical condition resulting from 
the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight 
years after the date of injury; and 
(b) who files an application for hearing under 
Section 35-1-99. 
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not ex-
ceed 312 weeks nor continue more than eight years 
after the date of the injury. Payments shall terminate 
when the disability ends or the injured employee dies. 
1988 
35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of 
payments. 
An employee who sustained a permanent impair-
ment as a result of an industrial accident and who 
files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-99 
may receive a permanent partial disability award 
from the commission. 
Weekly payments may not in any case continue 
after the disability ends, or the death of the injured 
person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensa-
tion shall be 662/3% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more 
than a maximum of 662/3% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and 
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for 
a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four 
such dependent children, but not to exceed 662/3% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the in-
jury per week, to be paid weekly for the number of 
weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and 
shall be in addition to the compensation provided for 
temporary total disability and temporary partial dis-
ability, to wit: 
For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
(A) Upper extremity 
(1) Arm 
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter ampu-
tation) 218 
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid 
insertion 187 
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and 
elbow joint, at elbow joint, or below 
elbow joint proximal to insertion of 
biceps tendon 178 
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to in-
sertion of biceps tendon 168 
(2) Hand 
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or 
midmetacarpal amputation 168 
(b) All fingers except thumb at metacarpo-
phalangeal joints 101 
(3) Thumb 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with 
resection of carpometacarpal bone . . . . 67 
(b) At interphalangeal joint 50 
(4) Index finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with 
resection of metacarpal bone 42 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 34 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 18 
(5) Middle finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with 
resection of metacarpal bone 34 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 27 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 15 
(6) Ring finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with 
resection of metacarpal bone 17 
< b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 13 
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For the loss of Number of Weeks 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 8 
(7) Little finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with 
resection of metacarpal bone 8 
fb) At proximal interphalangeal joint 6 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 4 
(B) Lower extremity 
(1) Leg 
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis) 156 
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less 
below tuberosity of ischium 125 
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, 
at knee joint or Gntti Stokes amputa-
tion or below knee with short stump 
(three inches or less below 
intercondylar notch) 112 
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump 88 
(2) Foot 
(a) Foot at ankle 88 
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's) 66 
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation 44 
(3) Toes 
(a) Great toe 
(I) With resection of metatarsal bone 26 
(n) At metatarsophalangeal joint 16 
(in) At interphalangeal joint 12 
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th) 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 4 
(n) At metatarsophalangeal joint 3 
(m) At proximal interphalangeal joint 2 
dv) At distal interphalangeal joint 1 
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints 26 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(a) One eye by enucleation 120 
(b) Total blindness of one eye 100 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing 100 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be 
deemed equivalent to loss of the member Partial loss 
or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the com-
plete loss or loss of use of the member This para-
graph, however, shall not apply to the items listed 
[in] (B) (4) 
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be 
determined and paid as follows 
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing 
loss measured in decibels with frequencies of 500, 
1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per second (cps) using 
pure tone air conduction audiometric instruments 
(ANSI 1969) approved by nationally recognized au-
thorities in the field of measurement of hearing im-
pairment Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies 
above 3000 cycles per second shall not be considered 
in determining compensable disability If the average 
decibel loss at 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per 
second is 25 decibels or less, usually no hearing im-
pairment exists 
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medi-
cal and paramedical professionals appointed by the 
commission shall measure the loss in each ear at the 
four frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per 
second which shall be added together and divided by 
four to determine the average decibel loss To deter-
mine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, the 
average decibel loss for each decibel of loss exceeding 
25 decibels shall be multiplied by VI2% up to the 
maximum of 100% which is reached at 92 decibels 
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying 
the percentage of hearing loss in the better ear by 
five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in the 
poorer ear and dividing by six The resulting figure is 
the percentage of binaural hearing loss Compensa-
tion for permanent partial disabihtv for binaural 
hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the 
percentage of binaural hearing loss by 100 weeks of 
compensation benefits as provided in this chapter 
Where an employee files one or more claims for hear-
ing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously 
found to exist shall be deducted from any subsequent 
award by the commission In no event shall compen-
sation benefits be paid for total or 100% binaural 
hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks of compensation 
benefits 
For an> permanent impairment caused by an in-
dustrial accident that is not otherwise provided for m 
the schedule of losses in this section, permanent par 
tial disability compensation shall be awarded by the 
commission based on the medical evidence Compen 
sation for any such impairment shall, as closely as 
possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the 
schedule set forth in this section Permanent partia 
disability compensation may not in any case exceec 
312 weeks, which shall be considered the period 0 
compensation for permanent total loss of bodily func 
tion Permanent partial disability compensation maj 
not be paid for any permanent impairment that ex 
isted prior to an industrial accident 
The amounts specified in this section are all subjec 
to the limitations as to the maximum weekly amoun 
payable as specified in this section, and in no even 
shall more than a maximum of 662/3% of the stat 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury for 
total of 312 weeks in compensation be required to b 
paid 198 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amoun 
of payments — Rehabilitation. 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused b 
an industrial accident, the employee shall receiv 
compensation as outlined in this section Permaner 
total disability for purposes of this chapter requires 
finding by the commission of total disability, as me* 
sured b> the substance of the sequential decisioi 
making process of the Social Security Administratio 
under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations 1 
revised The commission shall adopt rules that coi 
form to the substance of the sequential decision-mal 
ing process of the Social Security Administration u] 
der 20 C F R Subsections 404 1520 (b), (c), (d), (
€ 
and (f)(1) and (2), as revised 
(2) For permanent total disability compensate 
during the initial 312-week entitlement, compens 
tion shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's averaj 
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as f( 
lows 
(a) Compensation per week may not be mo 
than 85% of the state average weekly wage at tl 
time of the injury 
(b) Compensation per week may not be le 
than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a c 
pendent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent ch] 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum 
four such dependent minor children, but not « 
ceeding the maximum established in Subsecti 
(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of t 
employee at the time of the injury 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimi 
weekly compensation rate under Subsection 
shall be jb'< of the curr nt state average weH 
wage, rounded to the nearest dollar 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is ha 
for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disabil 
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(vin) a statement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in 
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall de-
termine all questions of fact and law and any 
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judi-
cial proceedings under this section 1988 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure [Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court], except that 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record, 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record 
(I) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record, or 
(n) according to any other provision of 
law 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied, 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute, 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution, 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law, 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure, 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification, 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court, 
(h) the agency action is 
d) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute, 
UO contrary to a rule of the agency, 
i 0 .on^iry to the agency s prior prac-
tice, unlet>h the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency, or 
(IV) otherwise arbitrary or capricious 
1988 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudica-
tive proceedings by the district court or the re-
view of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap 
pellate court, the court may award damages or 
compensation only to the extent expressly autho-
rized by statute 
(b) In granting relief, the court may 
(I) order agency action required by law, 
(n) order the agency to exercise its discre-
tion as required by law, 
(111) set aside or modify agency action, 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of 
agency action, or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for 
further proceedings 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of 
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, 
if authorized by statute 1987 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other 
temporary remedies pending final dis-
position. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the 
agency may grant a stay of its order or other tempo-
rary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's rules 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or 
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary cir-
cumstances require immediate judicial intervention 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other tem-
porary remedies requested by a party, the agency's 
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall 
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary 
remedy was not granted 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other tempo-
rary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or 
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may 
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it 
finds that 
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying 
the stay, or 
(b) (l) the party seeking judicial review is likely 
to prevail on the merits when the court 
finally disposes of the matter, 
(n) the party seeking judicial review will 
suffer irreparable injury without immediate 
relief, 
(in) granting relief to the party seeking 
review will not substantially harm other 
parties to the proceedings, and 
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, 
or welfare relied upon by the agency is not 
sufficiently serious to justify the agency's ac-
tion under the circumstances 1987 
63-46b-19. Civil enforcement. 
(1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by 
law, an agency may seek enforcement of an order 
by seeking civil enforcement in the district 
courts 
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an 
agency's order must name, as defendants, each 
alleged violator against whom the agency seeks 
to obtain civil enforcement 
(cj Venue ior an action >eetung civil enforce-
ment of an agency's order shall be determined by 
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Chapter 1 
Concepts 
of Impairment 
Evaluation 
1.0 Introduction 
T he AMA Guides to the Evaluation ofPermanent Impairment (the Guidei) provides a reference framework within which physicians may evalu-
ate and report medical impairment and within which 
nonmedical recipients of information about impairment 
may understand and make appropriate use of the medi-
cal information they receive 
The unique value of the Guides as tf*£ technical 
reference of choice for evaluation of medical impair-
ment, which goes well beyond its broad scope of cover-
age (all body parts and systems), anses from the precise 
application of fundamental medical and scientific 
concepts, the systematic analysis that introduces each 
of the clinical chapters, the detail of the medical evalua-
tion protocols, and the thorough state-of-the-art analy-
ses that underlie the rating tables In addition, a format 
for reports is described in Chapter 2 and summarized 
at the beginning of each clinical chapter to provide 
straightforward and well-structured guidelines so that 
reports about the same individual from different observ-
ers are likely to be of comparable content and com-
pleteness and may, therefore, be more easily analyzed 
and compared 
As is true of any other technical process, knowing 
the "rules," which in the case of the Guides are the 
specific procedures described in the clinical chapters, 
is not enough The user of the Guides, both physicians 
and nonphysicians alike, must understand the concepts 
under which the "rules" have been developed and the 
intended approach for using them to achieve objective, 
accurate, fair, and reproducible evaluations of individu-
als with medical impairment This chapter and Chapter 
2 will enable the user to become familiar with the 
techniques and approach to evaluation of impairment 
embodied in the Guides 
1.1 Basic Considerations 
Impairment-Disability-Handicap 
Various terms used in the Guides, such as "impairment" 
"disability" and "handicap," appear in laws, regulations 
and policies of diverse origin without prior coordina-
tion of the ways in which they are used It is no wonder, 
then, that there is uncertainty, if not controversy, about 
their meaning The definitions used m the Guides seek 
to remedy this confusion through detailed description 
and delineation of the domain in which each term is 
applied, for it is the characteristics of the domain that 
are important, not the word used as the label Accord-
ingly even when the terminology of the Guides may 
differ from or appear to be in conflict with that of a 
particular law, regulation or administrative system, anal-
ysis of the context in accordance with the following 
discussion should reveal how the principles embodied 
in the Guides may be interpreted and applied within 
the provisions of a particular disability system 
The accurate and proper use of medical informa-
tion to assess impairment in connection with disability 
determinations depends on the recognition that, whereas 
impairment is a medical matter, disability arises out 
of the interaction between impairment and external 
demands. Consequently, as used in the Guides, 
"impairment" means an alteration of an individual's 
health status that is assessed by medical means; "dis-
ability," which is assessed by nonmedical means, 
means an alteration of an individual's capacity to meet 
personal, social, or occupational demands, or to meet 
statutory or regulatory requirements. Simply stated, 
"impairment" is what is wrong with the health of an 
individual; "disability" is the gap between what the 
individual can do and what the individual needs or 
wants to do. 
An individual who is "impaired" is not necessar-
ily "disabled." Impairment gives rise to disability only 
when the medical condition limits the individual's capac-
ity to meet demands that pertain to nonmedical fields 
and activities.1 On the other hand, if the individual is 
able to meet a particular set of demands, the individual 
is not "disabled" with respect to those demands, even 
though a medical evaluation may reveal impairment. 
The concept of "handicap" is related to, yet inde-
pendent of, both "impairment" and "disability" although 
it is sometimes used interchangeably with either of 
these terms. Under the provisions of Federal law,2 an 
individual is identified as "handicapped" if that indi-
vidual has an impairment that substantially limits one 
or more life activities, including work, has a record of 
such impairment, or is regarded as having such an 
impairment.3 The terms of this definition are so indefi-
nite and broad that, technically, almost any person who 
desires to do so might be included in the class of the 
handicapped under the law. 
As a matter of practicality, however, a "handicap" 
may be operationally understood as being manifest in 
association with a "barrier" or obstacle to functional 
activity. An individual with limited functional capacity 
is handicapped if there are barriers to accomplishment 
of tasks or life activities that can be overcome only by 
compensating in some way for the effects of an impair-
ment. Such compensation, or, more technically, 
"accommodation," normally entails the use of assistive 
devices (such as crutches, wheel chairs, hearing aids, 
optical magnifiers, prostheses, special tools or equip-
ment), modification of the environment, and/or modifi-
cation of tasks or activities (such as increased time for 
task completion, or special segmentation of tasks). Any 
1. The commonly used example of the impact of the loss of the fifth 
finger of the left hand illustrates the point. If the individual is a bank 
president, the occupational impact is likely to be negligible On the other 
hand, a concert pianist is likely to be totally disabled. 
2. The Rehabilitauon Act of 1973. 
one these modalities, or all in combination, may be 
invoked to enable a handicapped person to overcome 
a barrier to an objective. If the individual is not able 
to accomplish a task or activity despite accommodation, 
or if there is no accommodation that will enable the 
accomplishment, then, in addition to being handi-
capped, the individual is also disabled. On the other 
hand, an impaired individual who is able to accomplish 
a task or activity without accommodation is, with 
respect to that task or activity, neither handicapped 
nor disabled. 
For these reasons, it is difficult to overstate the 
importance of examining the context in which the terms 
"impairment," "disability," or "handicap" appear to avoid 
being misled by imprecise usage. For example, refer-
ence to a physician's evaluation of "disability" must be 
understood as a reference to a medical evaluation of an 
individual's health status, or, in the terms of the Guides, 
an evaluation of impairment The physician does not 
determine industrial loss of use or economic loss for the 
purpose of paying a disability benefit. 
Employability—Management/ 
Administrative Considerations 
The concept of "employability" deserves special atten-
tion, for in an occupational setting, if an individual, 
within the boundaries of the medical condition, has the 
capacity with or without accommodation to meet the 
job demands and conditions of employment as defined 
by the employer, the individual is employable, and, 
consequendy, not disabled. As an operational matter, 
employability is critically related to an individual's 
capacity to travel to and from work, to be at work, and 
to perform assigned tasks and duties for which the 
employer is willing to pay wages. If the individual has 
those capacities, even in the presence of impairment, 
then the individual is not disabled for that job. When 
these capacities are called into question, for whatever 
reason, the employer must carry out an "employability 
determination." 
As in determination of disability, there are both 
administrative and medical components to the employ-
ability determination, the process by which an employer 
initially assesses an individual's qualifications and suit-
ability for employment. On the administrative side, 
management will specifically assess performance capa-
bility to estimate the likelihood of a performance failure 
3. The law does not make clear by whom the individual must be 
"regarded" as being handicapped. There are cases on record in which an 
employer "accommodated" the individual even though there was no 
clear evidence or record of medical impairment. In these cases, it was 
determined that the individual was protected as handicapped under the 
law because the employer, by offering accommodation, had regarded the 
individual as handicapped. 
as well as the likelihood of incurring a future liability in 
case of human failure If neither likelihood of failure is 
too great, then the individual is considered to be employ-
able in a particular job This represents a fundamental 
"go" or "no go" determination that there is or is not a 
sufficient match between an individual and the job 
requirements to give further consideration to employ-
ment It is different from a "desirability" determination, 
which would rank and compare the individuals who 
are employable 
During the course of employment, there is 
on-going reassessment of an individual's employabihty 
through monitoring of performance, conduct, and atten-
dance Employment continues until the employee leaves 
voluntarily or until a change gives rise to a deficiency 
in performance, conduct, or attendance so that reten-
tion in the job can no longer be justified When an 
individual claims to be no longer employable, or disa-
bled, because of a change m health, or alleges that a 
medical condmon has caused a service deficiency, the 
employer has little choice but to conduct an employ-
ability determination and to assess the individual's 
capacity to travel to and from work, to be at work and 
to perform assigned tasks and duties Disability, then, is 
the default result when it is determined that the indi-
vidual lacks employabihty 
Employability-Medical Considerations 
As noted above, an employable individual has the capac-
ity to travel to and from work, to be at work, and to 
perform assigned tasks and duties On the other hand, 
an individual who does not have the capacity, or who is 
unwilling, to travel to and from work, to be at work, and 
to perform assigned tasks and duties is not employable 
The issue of disability arises from the critical questions 
of whether or not the service deficiency can be explained 
by a medical condition and whether or not the medical 
condition precludes, or warrants restriction from, trav-
eling to and from work, being at work, or performing 
assigned tasks and duties The answer is found in a 
"medical determination related to employabihty" 
The first critical task in carrying out a medical 
determination related to employabihty is to learn about 
the job, specifically the expectations of the incumbent 
with respect to performance, physical activity, reliabil-
ity, availability productivity, expected duration of use-
ful service life and any other criteria associated with 
qualification and suitability Sufficiently detailed infor-
mation from a job analysis will provide a basis upon 
which a physician determines exactly what kinds of 
medical information are needed, and to what degree of 
detail, to assess an individual's health with respect to 
demand criteria Once the medical information needs 
are known, it is possible to develop a medical evalua-
tion protocol, a set of instructions for performance of a 
medical evaluation designed to acquire that information 
However, a special medical evaluation may not be 
necessary, for, presumably, an individual who alleges 
disability would already be under the care of a personal 
physician, and if not, should be if the medical condition 
is interfering with life activities on or off the job And, 
since a claimant bears the initial burden of proof, the 
place to start, then, is with review of medical informa-
tion already available in the form of medical office and 
hospital records Through this medium, the physician 
making the determination of employabihty may com-
municate with the personal physician to learn whatever 
is known about that individual's health so that, in accor-
dance with established medical diagnostic criteria and 
generally accepted medical principles and practice, the 
two physicians may come to agreement about what is 
and is not known medically about the patient and deter-
mine what other information is necessary to resolve 
areas of medical uncertainty This is nothing more or 
less than physicians do in the course of cooperative 
management of their patients The practice of medicine 
is not an adversary process, and, consequently, by 
relying on communications and decisionmaking proce-
dures ordinarily used by physicians, evaluations of 
impairment and medical determinations related to 
employabihty may be managed without confrontation 
between them With respect to employabihty, then, the 
medical questions to be answered are whether or not 
medical documentation supports a conclusion that the 
individual's medical condition precludes travel to and 
from work, being at work, or performing assigned tasks 
and duties,4 and, in the case of a service deficiency, 
whether or not the documentation provides reason to 
believe that the medical condition has either caused or 
contributed to the deficiency 
If review of the documentation does not show 
that the individual has met the required burden of 
proof, the employer or insurance company must decide 
whether or not acquisition of additional medical infor-
mation is likely to enable the individual to do so Or, 
there may be a need to verify clinical findings con-
tained in the documentation provided If so, the medi-
cal evaluation protocol will serve as a basis for a medi-
cal evaluation by any physician, for, in general, two 
4 If the medical condition does not for example preclude daily travel to 
and from a physical therapy clinic then it would be unlikely for the 
medical condition to preclude travel to and from place of work Or if an 
individual has not been restricted from shopping for and carrying gro-
ceries from doing chores around the house or from going to the movies, 
then there is little defense for a conclusion that the medical condition 
would warrant restriction from a similar level of activities in the workplace 
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physicians examining the same patient under the same 
protocol will have approximately the same set of 
findings. Taken with the prior information, the results 
of this evaluation may be reviewed to reach conclu-
sions that can then be compared with the demand 
criteria for the job. This can always be done with credi-
bility and confidence, since the specifications for the 
medical evaluation are based on the demand criteria to 
begin with. 
When approached in this way, the medical input 
into the employability determination will be quite inde-
pendent of the individual's motivation to work, or lack 
of it. Moreover, because this process provides medical 
justification for the decision, a dispute over conflicting 
opinions of physicians about nonmedical matters need 
never occur. 
1.2 Structure and Use of the Guides 
Since any person has only one health status and only 
one life situation, given enough information about each, 
it is possible to understand the relationship and interac-
tion between them. Moreover, because the evaluation 
of permanent impairment is not an isolated event but 
culminates the evolution of changes in health that result 
from injury or disease, the design of the Guides requires 
integration of already existing medical and nonmedical 
information with the results of a current clinical evalua-
tion, carried out in accordance with the protocols of the 
Guides, to characterize fully and assess medical impair-
ment. Accomplishment of this objective is based on 
utilization of three powerful tools that make up the 
fundamental components of the Guides. 
First, Chapter 2 details with great precision the 
kinds of information needed to document the nature of 
an impairment and its consequences, specifies proce-
dures for acquiring the information, and defines a struc-
tured format for analyzing, recording, and reporting 
the information. A summary of these requirements and 
procedures appears at the beginning of each clinical 
chapter. 
Second, the clinical chapters contain definitive 
medical evaluation protocols, descriptions of specific 
procedures for evaluating a particular body part, func-
tion, or system, each developed by recognized medical 
specialty consultants. These protocols are defined in 
specific detail to ensure the acquisition of sufficient 
information to describe fully and characterize the cur-
rent clinical status of a medical impairment. 
Third, the clinical chapters contain reference 
tables specifically keyed to the evaluation protocols. If 
the protocols and tables have been followed, the clini-
cal findings may be compared directly to the criteria 
and related to a percentage of impairment with 
confidence in the validity and acceptability of the 
determination. 
Operationally, the key to effective and reliable 
evaluation of impairment is initially a review of clinical 
medical office and hospital records maintained by the 
physicians who have provided care and treatment since 
the onset of the medical condition. Such records com-
prise clinical notes of office visits, medical specialty 
consultation reports, hospital admission and discharge 
summaries, operative notes, pathology reports, labora-
tory test reports and the results of special tests and 
diagnostic procedures. Before formal evaluation is car-
ried out under the Guides, analysis of the history and 
course of the medical condition, beginning with the 
circumstances of onset, and including findings on pre-
vious examinations, the course of treatment, responses 
to treatment, and the impact of the medical condition 
on life activities, must support a conclusion that an 
impairment is permanent and well stabilized 
This information gathering and analysis serves as 
the foundation upon which the evaluation of a perma-
nent impairment is carried out. It is most important that 
the evaluator obtain all clinical information necessary 
to characterize fully the medical condition in accor-
dance with requirements of the Guide?, an incomplete 
or partial evaluation is not acceptable. Once this task is 
accomplished, the clunical findings may be compared 
to the clinical information already contained in the 
records about the individual. If the current findings 
are found to be consistent with the results of previous 
clinical evaluations performed by other observers, then, 
with complete confidence, they may be compared, as 
appropriate or required, with the reference tables to 
determine the percentage rating of the impairment. 
However, if the findings are not in substantial accor-
dance with the information of record, then, until fur-
ther clinical evaluation resolves the disparities, the 
rating step is meaningless and cannot be carried out. 
This approach takes advantage of the fact that 
physicians normally communicate cooperatively with 
each other orally and in writing to determine what they 
do and do not know about a patient, and to determine 
further what additional information they need to resolve 
areas of medical uncertainty. It does not make sense, 
therefore, to manage cases in which there are differing 
"opinions" among physicians about the nature and 
degree of medical impairment by asking a nonmedical 
third party to adjudicate an issue of medical fact! Such 
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differences are best handled through the ordinary pro-
cess of everyday patient management. Then, with refer-
ence to the past medical documentation, the medical 
evaluation protocols contained in the clinical chapters 
and the reporting specifications of Chapter 2, the physi-
cian and nonphysician users of the Guides may verify 
that sufficient medical information has been assembled 
and reported to permit an assessment of an impairment, 
to justify any conclusions that are drawn, and to sup-
port a rating in accordance with the tables. At that 
point, it is a straightforward matter to verify whether or 
not a numerical rating of impairment is substantiated 
in accordance with the criteria contained in the Guides. 
1.3 Medical Impairment and 
Workers' Compensation 
In general, state and Federal workers' compensation 
laws are based on the concept that a worker who either 
sustains an injury or incurs an illness arising in the 
course of and out of employment is entitled to protec-
tion against financial loss without being required to 
sue the employer. In exchange for their having lost the 
right to sue, the workers' compensation system guaran-
tees benefits to all workers who are covered under the 
law and who meet the criteria for award of benefits. 
The types of payments that may be made when a 
claim is approved fall into three categories: 
• payments to the claimant to compensate for lost wages 
due to temporary total disability; 
• payment of medical bills; and 
• payment to the claimant of an award for permanent 
disability, partial or total. 
Up to this point, we have looked at disability as 
being related to functional capability or the lack of it. 
However, in the arena of disability benefits, disability 
whether temporary or permanent, partial or total, is 
equivalent to economic loss for which the individual is 
to be compensated monetarily. 
Payments are made for temporary total disability 
when the individual is unable to earn wages, return to 
work is expected, and the medical condition has not 
stabilized.5 Temporary disability is partial when the indi-
vidual returns to work but is not earning at the prior 
level. 
5. In accordance with the earlier discussion, "temporary total disability" 
occurs when the medical condiuon precludes the individual from travel-
ing to and from work, being at work, and performing assigned tasks and 
duties. 
A permanent disability award is normally inde-
pendent of the individual's capacity to work and is 
formulated in terms of expected or presumed long-term 
or permanent economic loss associated with a perma-
nent medical impairment, such as an amputation. Such 
an award may be paid according to a schedule that 
specifically associates impairment with certain body 
parts, functions, or systems; examples are amputations, 
loss of sight, and loss of hearing, and a schedule is 
defined in the workers' compensation law to equate the 
disability with a maximum number of weeks for which 
benefits are to be paid at a rate based on average 
weekly wages. 
Rating of partial disability is necessary when a 
law, in recognition that the "loss of" or "loss of use of" 
the body part, function, or system may be less than 
total, requires determination of the proportion or per-
centage of loss. For example, in Maryland, the law says: 
In all cases where there has been an amputation 
of a part of any member of the body herein speci-
fied, or the loss of use ^/(emphasis added) any 
part thereof...the Commission shall allow com-
pensation for such proportion of the total num-
ber of weeks allowed for the amputation or loss 
of use of the entire member as the affected or 
amputated portion bears to the whole.6 
Moreover, because not all conditions that can arise 
out of an injury are accounted for in a schedule, back 
injuries, for example, there is likely to be a provision of 
the law similar to the following: 
In all other cases of disability other than those 
specifically enumerated disabilities7...which dis-
ability is partial in character, but permanent in 
quality, the Commission shall determine the por-
tion or percentage by which the industrial use of 
the employee's body was impaired as a result of 
the injury and in determining such portion or 
percentage of impairment8 resulting in industrial 
loss, the Commission shall take into consider-
ation, among other things, the nature of the 
physical injury, the occupation, experience, 
training, and age of the injured employee, and 
shall award compensation in such proportion 
as the determined loss bears to 500 weeks...9 
(emphasis added) 
6. Workmen's Compensauon Law of Maryland, Annotated, 1983, Art. 
101, §36(3). 
7. Note the context with which "disability" and "disabilies" are used. 
Clearly, the terms should be read as "impairment" and "impairments." 
8. Should this read "disability"? 
9. Ibid. Art. \0\,36(4)(a). 
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While medical information is necessary for the decision 
process, a critical problem arises in the use of that 
information. Neither in this example nor in general is 
there a formula under which knowledge of the medical 
condition may be combined with knowledge of the 
other factors to calculate the percentage by which 
the industrial use of the employee's body is impaired. 
Accordingly, each commissioner or hearmg official must 
come to a conclusion based on his or her own assess-
ment of the available medical and nonmedical 
information. 
It is evident that the Guides does not offer a 
solution for this problem, nor is it the intention that it 
do so. Each administrative or legal system that uses 
permanent impairment as a basis for disability rating 
needs to define its own process for translating knowl-
edge of a medical condition into an estimate of the 
degree to which the individual's capacity to meet per-
sonal, social, or occupational demands, or to meet stat-
utory or regulatory requirements, is limited by the 
impairment. We encourage each system not to make 
a "one-to-one" translation of impairment to disability, 
in essence creating a use of the Guides which is not 
intended. 
Chapter 2 will emphasize that it is essential for 
the physician to provide the recipient of the medical 
information with more than a number that represents a 
percentage of impairment. To the extent that the physi-
cian provides a comprehensive medical picture in the 
form of a report formulated in accordance with (Figure 
1), the user of the information will be able to determine 
how the medical information fits with all the other 
nonmedical information, thereby to reach a true under-
standing of the impact of the medical impairment on 
the claimant's future employability. 
ADDENDUM D 
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that the parties agreed to purchase and sell 
parcel one based on the physical bound-
aries of the parcel and decided on a price 
for that parcel without regard to the acre-
age of parcel one. 
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
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Kathleen NYREHN, Petitioner, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, Fred 
Meyer Stores and/or Liberty Mutual 
Insurance, Respondents. 
No. 900010-CA. 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
Oct. 25, 1990. 
Worker sought review of denial of 
workers' compensation benefits. The 
Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) 
worker who did not appeal from adminis-
trative law judge's order in her favor could 
raise claims of error with respect to his 
findings which were adverse to her when 
her employer appeals, and (2) worker estab-
lished legal causation with respect to back 
injury, notwithstanding her preexisting in-
jury. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Workers' Compensation <3=>1846 
Worker was not required to appeal 
from adverse rulings of administrative law 
judge who entered an order in her favor in 
order to assert as appellee on appeal that 
those findings were erroneous. 
2. Workers' Compensation <s=»1939.7 
Court is not required to give deference 
to conclusions of Industrial Commission on 
grounds that Commission has expertise and 
familiarity with the work environment, al-
though there may be some complex work 
activities which require deference to the 
Commission's evaluation of whether work-
related exertion exceeds the exertion of 
nonemployment life. 
3. Workers' Compensation <§=>554 
Administrative law judge may not sim-
ply presume that finding of preexisting 
condition warrants application of the Allen 
test for determining whether there is a 
causal relation between work and injury. 
4. Workers' Compensation <s=»554 
Finding that worker's preexisting con-
dition contributed to injury may not be 
implied. 
5. Administrative Law and Procedure 
®=*763 
Failure of agency to make adequate 
findings of &£t on material issues renders 
its findings arbitrary and capricious unless 
the evidence is clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of only one conclusion. 
6. Workers' Compensation <3=>552 
Legal causation test to be applied to 
workers who suffer from preexisting condi-
tion is not meant to prevent workers with 
preexisting conditions from recovering ben-
efits; higher standard of legal causation is 
intended to offset the preexisting condition 
of the employee as a likely cause of injury, 
thereby eliminating claims for impairments 
resulting from a personal risk rather than 
exertions at work. 
7. Workers' Compensation <s=>517 
When accident is climax of repeated 
exertions, the work-related exertion is, for 
purposes of proving legal causation, the 
aggregate exertion of the repetitive exer-
tions that established the accident; in de-
termining whether there is causation, court 
must consider the whole burden on the 
camel, and not just the straw that breaks 
the camel's back. 
8. Workers' Compensation <s=>1542 
Although worker suffered from preex-
isting back condition, evidence that, for two 
and one-half months, she was required to 
lift tubs of merchandise 30 to 36 times a 
day showed that she engaged in activity 
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which was not typical of nonemployment 
activity and thus showed causation with 
respect to her back injury. 
William W. Downes, Jr., David Eckersley 
(argued), Salt Lake City, for petitioner. 
Michael E. Dyer (argued), Brad C. Bete-
benner, Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, 
Salt Lake City, for Fred Meyer Stores. 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator (ar-
gued), Salt Lake City, for Employers Rein-
surance Fund. 
Before BENCH, GARFF and 
CONDER \ JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Kathleen Nyrehn petitions this court for 
review of the Industrial Commission's deni-
al of workers' compensation benefits. We 
reverse. 
Nyrehn worked as a stock room clerk for 
Fred Meyer Stores. Her duties included 
pricing and sorting merchandise contained 
in tubs which were approximately 2V2 feet 
wide, 2V2 feet long, and IV2 to 2 feet tall. 
The tubs weighed between fifteen and for-
ty pounds each, depending on the contents, 
and were stacked upon each other. Ny-
rehn would lift and carry the tubs to and 
from a sorting area approximately thirty to 
thirty-six times a day. In addition to lift-
ing the tubs, Nyrehn was involved in con-
stant bending and stooping to sort mer-
chandise into different tubs. On January 
23, 1985, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Ny-
rehn felt a gradual onset of pain in her 
lower back while performing her duties at 
work. Despite the pain she continued to 
1. Dean E. Conder, Senior District Court Judge, 
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1990). 
2. In concluding that Nyrehn had not satisfied 
the Allen test, the A.L.J. stated that he followed 
the "legal doctrine" of Smith <fir Edwards v. In-
dustrial Commission, 770 P.2d 1016 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (lifting 47lA pounds by itself did not 
constitute an unusual exertion). Nyrehn argues 
that this statement indicates that the A.L.J. 
based his conclusion on weight alone, which is 
inappropriate. American Roofing Co. v. Indus. 
work. The pain worsened until she finally 
had to leave work early at approximately 
4:00 p.m. After three back operations, Ny-
rehn's pain persisted and she was still un-
able to work. She therefore sought perma-
nent disability benefits. 
After a hearing, an Administrative Law 
Judge (A.L.J.) made the following relevant 
findings of fact: (1) Nyrehn's pain of Janu-
ary 23, 1985 was not the result of a certain 
incident or activity, but rather the result of 
"two and [a] half months of lifting tubs of 
merchandise 30 to 36 times a day;" (2) 
Nyrehn had an asymptomatic pffpyicHngr 
condition, spondylolysis (disintegration or 
dissolution of a vertebra); and (3) 75% of 
Nyrehn's total permanent impairment ex-
isting at examination was "caused by the 
industrial accident of January 23, 1985," 
and 25% was due to "preexisting incapacity 
of spondylolysis.." 
The A.L.J. also made the following rele-
vant conclusions of law: (1) Nyrehn injured 
her lower back "by accident" in that her 
injury was neither planned nor foreseen; 
(2) there was a direct medical causal rela-
tionship between the industrial accident 
and Nyrehn's back problems; (3) due to her 
preexisting condition, Nyrehn was required 
to prove legal causation under Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986); and (4) Nyrehn's job duties of lifting 
tubs of merchandise weighing between fif-
teen and forty pounds did not amount to 
unusual or extraordinary exertion in excess 
of the normally expected level of nonem-
ployment activity for men and women in 
the latter half of the twentieth century as 
required in Allen.2 
Despite his conclusion that Nyrehn failed 
to satisfy the Allen test, the A.L.J. award-
ed Nyrehn permanent total disability bene-
Comm'n, 752 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
Fred Meyer, on the other hand, argues that the 
A.LJ. considered the total circumstances since 
at the conclusion of the hearing he referred to 
various factors besides the weight of the tubs, 
including the repetitive nature of the lifting. 
Since we base our decision on other grounds, 
we need not determine whether the A.LJ. erro-
neously applied a bright-line test rather than 
consider the totality of the circumstances as 
required by Smith & Edwards. 
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fits. He refused to apply Allen because he 
felt that the test was at odds with other 
Utah Supreme Court cases indicating that 
handicapped workers should not be placed 
in a hardship in receiving compensation 
benefits. He also indicated that he be-
lieved the Allen test to be unconstitutional 
because it set a different standard for such 
handicapped workers. 
Fred Meyer Stores and Liberty Mutual 
Insurance (referred to collectively as Fred 
Meyer) filed a motion with the Industrial 
Commission to review the A.LJ.'s award. 
On review, the Commission adopted the 
factual findings of the A.L.J. and his con-
clusion that Nyrehn failed to prove legal 
causation as required under Allen. The 
Commission then reversed the A.LJ.'s 
award of benefits, indicating that despite 
the A.LJ.'s concerns over the constitution-
ality of the Allen test, the Commission was 
required to apply the test. The Commis-
sion concluded that inasmuch as Nyrehn 
failed to satisfy the Allen test she was not 
entitled to benefits. Nyrehn then peti-
tioned this court to review the Industrial 
Commission's order. 
WAIVER OF APPEAL 
[1] Fred Meyer argues that Nyrehn has 
waived her right to challenge the A.LJ.'s 
finding that she did not prove legal causa-
tion because she did not file her own mo-
tion for review of that finding with the 
Commission.3 Fred Meyer erroneously re-
lies on Pease v. Industrial Commission, 
694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984). In Pease, the 
Utah Supreme Court interpreted the fol-
lowing provision: "(1) Any party in interest 
who is dissatisfied with the order entered 
by an administrative law judge or the com-
mission may file a motion for review of 
3. In essence, Fred Meyer urges us to adopt the 
following rule: If an A.L.J. makes a possibly 
erroneous finding of fact or conclusion of law 
that is contrary to the prevailing party, but 
which did not prevent the party from prevailing, 
that party must nevertheless seek review in or-
der to preserve any challenge of the possibly 
erroneous finding/conclusion in the event the 
losing party moves for review. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22(2) (Supp.1990) 
provides: 
such order." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-82.53(1) (Supp.1983) (emphasis add-
ed). The supreme court concluded that 
when an applicant files for review under 
this section, he must raise all possible is-
sues or the issues not raised would be 
considered waived. Id. at 616. There is no 
indication in Pease that a prevailing party 
has an affirmative duty to seek review 
from faulty findings. Nor do we perceive 
any such duty in the language of the stat-
ute which is clearly permissive. 
Although the conclusion of the A.L.J. 
regarding legal causation may have been 
faulty, any such error was rendered harm-
less to Nyrehn by the subsequent award of 
benefits. If Fred Meyer had not filed for 
review, she would have had her benefits. 
Nyrehn simply did not have any reason to 
appeal until the Commission denied her 
benefits. Cf. Halladay v. Cluff, 739 P.2d 
643, 645 (Utah Ct.App.1987) ("Cross-ap-
peals are properly limited to grievances a 
party has with the judgment as it was 
entered—not grievances it might acquire 
depending on the outcome of the appeal."). 
In petitioning this court to review the deni-
al of benefits, Nyrehn is seeking review of 
the Commission's conclusion that she did 
not prove legal causation. She is not seek-
ing review of the A.LJ.'s conclusion. The 
issue of whether Nyrehn proved legal cau-
sation is therefore properly before us. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Inasmuch as these proceedings were 
commenced prior to January 1, 1988, the 
effective date of the Utah Administrative 
Procedure Act (UAPA), we look to the pri-
or case law to determine the proper stan-
dard of review.4 
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency ac-
tion, agency review, and judicial review that 
are in effect on December 31, 1987, govern all 
agency adjudicative proceedings commenced 
by or before an agency on or before Decem-
ber 31, 1987, even if those proceedings are 
still pending before an agency or a court on 
January 1, 1988. 
For a discussion of UAPA's effect on our re-
view of agency findings of fact, see Grace Drill-
ing Co. v. Bd. of Review of the Industrial Com-
mission, 776 P.2d 63, 66-68 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
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• deferential. "[T]he reviewing court's in-
quiry is whether the Commission's findings 
are 'arbitrary or capricious,' or 'wholly 
without cause' or contrary to the 'one [inev-
itable] conclusion from the evidence' or 
without 'any substantial evidence' to sup-
port them. Only then should the Commis-
sion's findings be displaced." Kaiser Steel 
Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 
1981). 
As to the Commission's conclusion that 
Nyrehn's work-related exertion did not sat-
isfy the Allen test, our review is more 
searching: 
The question of whether the employ-
ment activities of a given employee are 
sufficient to satisfy the legal standard of 
unusual or extraordinary effort involves 
two steps. First the agency must deter-
mine as a matter of fact exactly what 
were the employment-related activities of 
the injured employee. Second, the agen-
cy must decide whether those activities 
amounted to unusual or extraordinary 
exertion. This second determination is a 
mixed question of law and fact. 
Price River Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 
731 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Utah 1986). 
[2] Our standard of review of mixed 
questions of law and fact is an interme-
diate review for reasonableness and ration-
ality. "The degree of deference extended 
to the decisions of the Commission on these 
intermediate types of issues has been given 
various expressions, but all are variations 
of the idea that the Commission's decisions 
must fall within the limits of reasonable-
ness or rationality." Sisco Hilte v. Indus. 
For a discussion of UAPA's effect on our review 
of mixed questions of law and fact, see Pro-Ben-
efit Staffing, Inc. v. Bd. of Review of the Indus-
trial Commission, 775 P.2d 439, 441-42 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989). 
5. Fred Meyer urges us to give considerable def-
erence to the conclusions of the Commission 
because of its "expertise in and familiarity with 
the work environment." Price River Coal, 731 
P.2d at 1084. The deference we accord an agen-
cy's disposition under intermediate review fluc-
tuates with the importance of the agency's ex-
pertise in determining the issue at hand: 
The more likely it is that agency expertise will 
assist in resolving an issue, the more defer-
ence courts should give to the agency's resolu-
1091 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (quoting Utah Dept. of Admin. 
Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 
601, 610 (Utah 1983)). 
"[Reasonableness must be determined 
with reference to the specific terms of 
the underlying legislation, interpreted in 
light of its evident purpose as revealed in 
the legislative history and in light of the 
public policy sought to be served." This 
standard appears to give us some flexi-
bility in reviewing the otherwise objec-
tive standard that must be applied by the 
Commission. 
Smith & Edwards Co. v. Indus. Comm 'n, 
770 P.2d 1016, 1018 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1989) 
(quoting Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs., 658 
P.2d at 611).5 
"Furthermore, ta facilitate the purposes 
of the legislation, the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act is to be liberally construed and any 
doubt as to compensation is to be resolved 
in favor of the applicant." USX Corp. v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883, 886 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989); Kaiser Steel Corp., 631 P.2d 
at 892; McPhie v. Indus. Comm'n, 567 
P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977). 
Guided by these standards we must de-
termine whether there was sufficient evi-
dence to warrant application of the higher 
Allen test for legal causation and whether 
the Commission's conclusion that Nyrehn 
failed to prove legal causation was a rea-
sonable and rational conclusion. 
RECOVERY OF BENEFITS 
In order to recover workers' compensa-
tion benefits, an employee must prove that 
she was injured "by accident arising out of 
tion. The less pertinent agency insight is—or 
the more likely it is that judicial expertise will 
be most helpful—the less deference need be 
paid by reviewing courts to the agency's dis-
position. 
Taylor v. Utah State Training School, 115 P.2d 
432, 434 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
We recognize that there may be some com-
plex work activities that require deference to 
the Commission's evaluation of whether the 
work-related exertion exceeds the exertion of 
nonemployment life, but in general the Com-
mission is no better suited to compare simple 
forms of work-related exertion than are we 
since "normal nonemployment life" is not with-
in the Commission's- area of expertise. 
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or in the course of [her] employment." 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988). "This 
statutory language creates two prerequi-
sites for a finding of compensable injury. 
First, the injury must be 'by accident/ 
Second, the language 'arising out of or in 
the course of employment' requires that 
there be a causal connection between the 
injury and the employment." Allen, 729 
P.2d at 18. The Utah Supreme Court held 
in Allen that a claimant must supply proof 
of both "legal" and "medical" causation. 
"Under the legal test, the law must define 
what kind of exertion satisfies the test of 
'arising out of the employment' . . . [then] 
the doctors must say whether the exertion 
(having been held legally sufficient to sup-
port compensation) in fact caused this [inju-
ry]." Larson, Workmen's Compensation 
§ 38.83(a), at 7-276 to 277 (1986) quoted in 
Alien, 729 P.2d at 25. 
To meet the legal causation requirement, 
a claimant with a preexisting condition 
must show that the employment contrib-
uted something substantial to increase 
the risk [she] already faced in everyday 
life because of [her] condition. This ad-
ditional element of risk in the work-place 
is usually supplied by an exertion greater 
than that undertaken in normal, every-
day life. This extra exertion serves to 
offset the preexisting condition of the 
employee as a likely cause of the injury, 
thereby eliminating claims for impair-
ments resulting from a personal risk 
rather than exertions at work. 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 25.6 
Therefore, the only two issues7 before 
us are (1) whether Nyrehn was "suffering 
6. This standard is often referred to as the higher 
standard of Allen since, "[w]here there is no 
preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exer-
tion is sufficient [to prove legal causation]." 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. Compare Hone v. IF. 
Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986) (exertion of 
putting on heavy pair of coveralls was sufficient 
when claimant did not have any preexisting 
back problems). 
7. Fred Meyer does not challenge the A.LJ.'s 
finding that Nyrehn was injured "by accident." 
Nor does it challenge the conclusion of the 
A.LJ. that the industrial accident was the medi-
cal cause of Nyrehn's disability. 
8. The A.LJ. did find—for purposes of allocating 
liability between the employer and the Employ-
from a preexisting condition which contrib-
ute^] to the injury/' Allen, 729 P.2d at 26, 
and (2) did the work-related exertion which 
caused Nyrehn's injury exceed the "usual 
wear and tear and exertions of nonem-
ployment life." Id. "If such a finding is 
made, then the requirement of legal cause 
is satisfied because it is presumed that the 
employment increased the risk of injury to 
which that worker was otherwise subject in 
[her] nonemployment life." Price River 
Coal Co., 731 P.2d at 1082. 
Preexisting Condition 
[3] An A.LJ. may not simply presume 
that the finding of a preexisting condition 
warrants application of the Allen test. An 
employer must prove medically that the 
claimant "suffers from a preexisting condi-
tion which contributes to the injury." Al-
len, 729 P.2d at 26. See, e.g., Price River 
Coal Co., 731 P.2d at 1082 (evidence proved 
that preexisting conditions "contributed 
greatly" to heart attack); Worker's Com-
pensation Fund v. Indus. Comm'n, 761 
P.2d 572 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (claimant suf-
fered from narcolepsy and emphysema and 
had a 36-year smoking habit, but no prior 
history of heart disease, Allen test there-
fore did not apply when claimant died of 
heart attack). 
[4,5] The factual findings of the Com-
mission are silent as to whether Nyrehn's 
preexisting back condition contributed to 
the industrial injury.8 The A.L.J, had 
merely concluded as a matter of law that 
ers' Reinsurance Fund—that 75% of the total 
permanent impairment existing at the time of 
the examination was "caused by the industrial 
accident of January 23, 1985," and 25% was due 
to "pre-existing incapacity." Such an allocation, 
however, is not proof that the preexisting condi-
tion somehow contributed to the injury of Janu-
ary 23, 1985, it only addresses the end result, 
i.e., the total disability at the time of the exami-
nation. See, e.g., Richfield Care Center v. Tor-
gerson, 733 P.2d 178, 180 (Utah 1987) (5% im-
pairment existed prior to accident, 7l/2% impair-
ment existed following accident, therefore only 
2VM attributed to the accident); cf. Zimmer-
man v. Indus. Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127, 1130 
(Utah Ct.App.1989) (permanent impairment re-
sulted solely from the preexisting conditions 
and not from the industrial accident or any 
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"[s]ince Ms. Nyrehn brought a pre-existing 
low back condition to the workplace,'' the 
Allen test applied. Implicit in such a legal 
conclusion is the critical factual finding 
that Nyrehn's preexisting condition contrib-
uted to her injury. Such material findings, 
however, may not be implied. In order for 
us to meaningfully review the findings of 
the Commission, the findings must be "suf-
ficiently detailed and include enough sub-
sidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual is-
sue was reached." Acton v. Deliran, 737 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker 
v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979)). The 
failure of a trial court to make adequate 
findings is reversible error. Id. Likewise, 
the failure of an agency to make adequate 
findings of fact oh material issues renders 
its findings "arbitrary and capricious" un-
less the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted 
and capable of only one conclusion/' Id. 
(quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 
236 (Utah 1983)). 
Since we conclude that Nyrehn's work-re-
lated exertion satisfied even the higher 
standard for proving legal causation, the 
Commission's failure to make adequate 
findings of fact was harmless. We there-
fore need not address whether there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain the Commis-
sion's implied finding. 
Legal Causation 
[6] The legal causation test adopted in 
Allen is not meant to prevent workers with 
preexisting conditions from recovering ben-
efits.9 "Just because a person suffers a 
preexisting condition, he or she is not dis-
qualified from obtaining compensation. 
Our cases make clear that 'the aggravation 
or lighting up of a pre-existing disease by 
an industrial accident is compensable 
. . . . ' " Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (quoting 
Powers v. Indus. Comm % 19 Utah 2d 140, 
143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967) (footnote 
omitted)). 
combination of the accident with the preexisting 
conditions). 
9. "It is the duty of the courts and the commis-
sion to construe the Workers' Compensation Act 
The higher standard of legal causation 
adopted in Allen is intended to "offset the 
preexisting condition of the employee as a 
likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminat-
ing claims for impairments resulting from 
a personal risk rather than exertions at 
work.11 Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (emphasis 
added). See also Price River Coal Co., 731 
P.2d at 1082 (legal causation test "is de-
signed to screen out those injuries that 
result from a personal condition . . . rather 
than from exertions required of the em-
ployee in the workplace"); Hone v. J.F. 
Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Utah 1986) 
(legal causation test is to distinguish be-
tween an injury which is "more likely than 
not produced by a risk related to the em-
ployment from one that is caused by a 
personal risk" (emphasis added)); Lancas-
ter v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1987) (the fact that heart attack occurred 
at work was a mere coincidence). 
"[T]he key question in determining cau-
sation is whether, given this body and this 
exertion, the exertion in fact contributed to 
the injury." Allen, 729 P.2d at 24. In 
order to answer this inquiry, we must first 
determine what "exertion" is at issue: the 
simple lifting of one tub of merchandise, or 
the repetitive lifting of many such tubs 
over an extended period of time. 
The Commission found that Nyrehn's 
pain resulted from "two and a half months 
of lifting tubs of merchandise 30 to 36 
times a day." The industrial accident, 
therefore, was not a single incident of lift-
ing one tub of merchandise; it was the 
climax of repetitive lifting. The Utah Su-
preme Court has broadly defined "acci-
dent" to include injuries which are the re-
sult of repetitive exertion. 
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from 
what would normally be expected to oc-
cur in the usual course of events 
[T]his is not necessarily restricted to 
some single incident which happened sud-
denly at one particular time and does not 
liberally and in favor of employee coverage 
when statutory terms reasonably admit such a 
construction." Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 
796 P.2d 676 (1990). 
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preclude the possibility that due to exer-
tion, stress or other repetitive cause, a 
climax might be reached in such a 
manner as to properly fall within the 
definition of an accident as just stated 
above. 
Carling v. Indus. Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 
260, 261-62, 399 P.2d 202, 203 (1965) quot-
ed with approval in Allen, 729 P.2d at 18. 
[7] When an accident is the climax of 
repeated exertions, as in Nyrehn's case, 
work-related "exertion," for purposes of 
proving legal causation, is the aggregate 
exertion of the repetitive exertions that 
establish the accident. See Miera v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1986) 
(claimant's repetitive "jumps into an eight-
foot hole [by way of] a four-foot platform 
at thirty-minute intervals constitute a con-
siderably greater exertion than that en-
countered in non-employment life").-. In 
other words, we must consider the whole 
burden on the camel and not just the straw 
that breaks the camel's back. See Smith 
& Edwards, 770 P.2d at 1018 (must consid-
er all factors related to exertion); Workers' 
Compensation Fund, 761 P.2d at 575 
(comparing cumulative effect of several 
factors, including driver's fatigue, anxiety, 
and the stress of driving through a snow 
storm, with the exertion of nonemployment 
life). 
In Allen, the supreme court listed the 
following examples of typical nonem-
ployment activities: "taking full garbage 
cans to the street, lifting and carrying bag-
gage for travel, changing a flat tire on an 
automobile, lifting a small child to chest 
height, and climbing the stairs in build-
ings." Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. While lifting 
a tub of merchandise weighing between 15 
and 40 pounds once or twice could likewise 
fit into the list of examples above, lifting 
such a tub 30 to 36 times a day for two and 
a half months is not a typical nonem-
ployment activity. The foregoing moder-
ately strenuous activities which may not be 
considered unusual when performed once 
or twice may nevertheless amount to un-
usual exertion when performed repeatedly. 
Otherwise, garbage collectors, baggage 
handlers, auto mechanics, childcare provid-
ers, etc., would be barred by the foregoing 
examples. 
[8] In the case before us it is unques-
tionable that two and a half months of 
lifting tubs of merchandise 30 to 36 times a 
day would cause unusual and extraordinary 
wear and tear on a body when compared 
with the "usual wear and tear and exer-
tions of nonemployment life." Allen, 729 
P.2d at 26. The test is not whether the 
type of exertion which caused the injury is 
unknown in nonemployment life, but rather 
whether the cumulative work-related exer-
tion exceeds the normal level of exertion in 
nonemployment life. We doubt that there 
are many physical activities outside of the 
workplace where this type of effort is be-
ing repeated so often over such a signifi-
cant period of time. 
The Commission's finding that Nyrehn's 
work-related exertion was not an unusual 
exertion was comparable to a conclusion 
that the typical nonemployment activities 
of people in today's society includes lifting 
a full garbage can 30 to 36 times per day 
each working day for two and a half 
months. Merely stating the comparison 
shows the fallacy of the Commission's find-
ing. Nyrehn's back injury was not a coinci-
dental injury which appeared at work with-
out any enhancement from the workplace. 
"[Her] employment contributed something 
substantial to increase the risk [she] al-
ready faced in everyday life because of 
[her] condition." Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. 
The Commission's conclusion that Nyrehn 
failed to prove legal causation was there-
fore not reasonable and rational. 
CONCLUSION 
Nyrehn's repetitive lifting of the tubs 
over an extended period of time was an 
unusual exertion as compared with the 
"usual wear and tear and exertions of non-
employment life." Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. 
We therefore conclude that Nyrehn proved 
legal causation. The Commission's order 
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denying Nyrehn her workers' compensation lated by the, A.L.J. Costs on review to 
benefits is reversed and the case is remand- petitioner, 
ed with instructions to grant Nyrehn bene-
fits for total permanent disability as calcu- GARFF and CONDER, JJ., concur. 
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